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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW SURROUND-
ING DATA AGGREGATION IN CYBERSPACE
Jonathan M.H. Short*
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of technological advances has traditionally created new and
unique legal problems. The solutions to counter these problems are often drawn
from our legal traditions and adapted to an ever-modernizing world. However, as
Professor Coase opined at the dawn of the communication technology revolution,
"lawyers and economists should not be so overwhelmed by the emergence of new
technologies as to change the existing legal and economic system without first
making quite certain that this is required."1 Examination and reflection, in other
words, is paramount to instituting a sound legal framework to encompass develop-
ing legal problems in technology.
This Article seeks to address the developing legal problems associated with
commercial data protection and gathering on the Internet. Although these prob-
lems were most recently addressed in two federal district cases, 2 this Article will
not deal with the details of those suits. Instead, this Article will seek to evaluate
the rights of data "owners" and data aggregators through an economic analysis of
possible legal regimes.
Part 1I of this Article examines the technical background of market transac-
tions in cyberspace. Specifically, it looks at data aggregation's affect on market
properties. Part III takes a more traditional look at cyberspace markets from an
efficiency perspective. Part IV addresses the choices of law that may be consid-
ered in cases of data aggregation. Part V provides an economic evaluation of those
choices of law. The Article closes with a brief conclusion.
While this Article seeks to choose a traditional legal remedy for modem prob-
lems of data aggregation, the reality of Internet activity demonstrates that such
easy answers are not possible. While it is important from an efficiency standpoint
to give potential Internet retailers incentives to enter the online market, such as
protecting price information from data aggregation, it is difficult to remedy a new
property interest in data with the efficiency that the open transfer of information
provides.
* Associate, McCarter & English, LLP, Intellectual Property Practice Group, Newark, New
Jersey; J.D., William and Mary School of Law; A.B., magna cum laude, Bowdoin College. All
views and opinions expressed in this Article are my own. 0 2003 Jonathan M.H. Short.
1. R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 40 (1959)
[hereinafter Coase, FCC].
2. Registercom, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's
Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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This Article does not propose that smaller-scale, more in-depth pricing and
product review operations, such as Consumer Reports, should be prohibited with-
out authorization. Instead, large-scale data aggregation, which by design provides
non-real time and often non-homogenous product and pricing comparisons, should
be controlled. A new property right is not feasible because it would restrict too
much efficient behavior that does not fall under the data aggregation problem.
Rather, a legal regime to regulate the manner in which data is aggregated and
disseminated is needed. The problem we are faced with is a problem of line draw-
ing; the only way to remedy the problems that data aggregation causes is to insti-
tute a legal regime that encourages parties to bargain to the most efficient result.
I. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
To understand the analysis, it is necessary to first understand the technical
aspects of data collection on the Internet. While a more in-depth analysis of these
aspects is available elsewhere, 3 a brief overview is proper for the purposes of this
Article. Data is most commonly collected via search engines. Search engines
employ software entities called "spiders" or "robots" that are periodically sent out
to scour the web for information.4 These software entities create "copies of web
sites from which the software culls relevant information to use in building a search-
able database." 5
Certain data aggregators use these software entities to copy the pricing infor-
mation from commercial sites. From this data, the aggregator creates a digested
listing, known as a metasite, of prices for products available online. Typically,
these aggregators use software agents, known as "shopbots," that employ "spiders
to amass product and pricing information to allow comparison shopping." 6
The conflict arises between the businesses whose information the aggregators
are collecting, and the aggregators. Those businesses that do not sanction the
collection of their data often argue that the publisher of a website should have
control over the manner in which the commercial data is used.7 The primary ratio-
nale is that businesses should be able to create and maintain their commercial
websites without the fear that the aggregators will unduly "steal or profit from the
3. See generally LAWRENCE Lssm, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Patricia L.
Bellia, Chasing BitsAcross Borders, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 35 (2001); Laura Quilter, Cyberlaw:
The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421
(2002); Harold Smith Reeves, Property in Cyberspace, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (1996); Melvin
Albritton, Comment, Swatting Spiders: An Analysis of Spider Activity on the Internet, 3 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 137 (2001); Susan M. Ballantine, Note, Computer Network Trespasses:
Solving New Problems with Old Solutions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 209 (2000); Daniel J.
Caffarelli, Note, Crossing Virtual Lines: Trespass on the Internet, 5 B.U. J. Scl. & TECH. L. 6
(1999); Steve Fischer, Note, When Animals Attack: Spiders and Internet Trespass, 2 MINN. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 139 (2001).
4. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and
Pricing Information?, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1965,1969 (2000) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Shaping Com-
petition].
5. Id.
6. id. at 1970.
7. Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld, Spiders and Crawlers and Bots, Oh My: The Economic Efficiency
and Public Policy of Online Contracts that Restrict Data Collection, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
3. 1 (2002), at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/02-STLR_3.
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fruits of their labor."8 Many propose a restrictive mechanism in order to protect
online data from unauthorized use.
Opponents of this view argue "that the efficient exchange of factual informa-
tion, unhampered by any legal or technological barrier, unquestionably benefits
society and weighs strongly against the enforceability of any restrictive mecha-
nism." 9 They point to self-help measures, such as the technological blocking of
robots, as better alternatives to legal regulation. 10
A. Self-Help
Businesses argue that these self-help measures are not effective against data
aggregation. The first measure, which requires the business to "incorporate a ro-
bot exclusion header, a text file that indicates that the site does not allow unautho-
rized robotic activity," is only effective if the aggregator's robot obeys the sugges-
tion. 11 In other words, "compliance with a robot exclusion header is entirely vol-
untary; a robot must be programmed to read the header and conform to its control
directives before searching a website."' 12 Robotic observance of these headers is
an implicit acknowledgment of non-auth6rization.
The second measure requires that a website continuously block server inquir-
ies from specific Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, but this is only possible after the
online retailer detects the presence of a robot through "repeated and rapid requests
generated from a single" IP address. 13 This measure is largely ineffective because
even a mildly sophisticated party can affect robot information requests by employ-
ing proxy servers, which disguise the originating IP address. 14 Simply put, an
aggregator can alter the robot's identification once the website blocks its informa-
tion request, and this can occur repeatedly. The website, therefore, cannot effec-
tively identify and block the robots because the identity changes too often to make
such a task feasible.
The final measure requires a website to restrict access to its information by
authorizing only requests from registered password users. 15 Robots, however, can
also use passwords, and current password technology is largely unable to distin-
guish human use from robotic use. 16 Additionally, requiring registration and pass-
word identification works as a hindrance to legitimate access by placing a barrier
between the individual and the data. 17 Legitimate users are less likely to use a
website that utilizes password security for mere browsing than one that does not.
As the examination of all three of these measures demonstrates, currently no
technological methods offer effective robot blocking without largely compromis-
ing authorized, and desired, public browsing. 18 Additionally, any advancement in
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. 3.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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data-protection technology is often met by a technological advancement on the
part of the aggregators: "the blocked robot will find a way to circumvent the new
technological barrier, causing the searched site to become even more restrictive,
and resulting in a 'technological arms race."' 19 Technology, therefore, has not
provided an efficient means by which online retailers can protect their commercial
data under current law.
B. Efficiency of Legal Restrictions
The argument against the imposition of legal restrictions on data aggregation
is based on creating an efficient market: "features of electronic markets and the
Internet may reduce the frictions of traditional commerce, which have heretofore
prevented an efficient market."'20 Proponents argue that by collecting all of the
available data and digesting it on one site for the consumer, these metasites offer
"a costless mechanism to determine pricing and product information for any com-
modity offered for sale by any vendor."21
However, proponents of legal restrictions argue that "economic modeling and
empirical evidence suggest that a rash transition to consumer reliance on metasites
may impede economic efficiency instead of promoting it. ' 22 The economic mod-
eling and empirical evidence suggest two outcomes. First, there is concern that
"unrestrained shopbot implementation may lead to either monopolistic practices
or price wars, which would unduly tax" commerce on the Internet.23 Under this
scenario, one metasite could become monopolistic, implementing unfair trade prac-
tices to control internet businesses, while simultaneously preventing entry of other
metasites into the market. Alternatively, there could be so many metasites that,
with shopbots running millions of requests every minute, the Internet infrastruc-
ture would become overburdened, slowing down or stopping access by consumers
and other authorized users.
Second, in counter to that concern, factors that are unrelated to search costs,
such as brand identification, consumer loyalty reward programs, and service qual-
ity, could preserve price dispersion and frustrate economic efficiency by allowing
established brands to become monopolistic. 24 Attachments to strong branding 25
may severely limit entrance of the multitude of metasites that would likely pop up.
Simply put, instead of testing one of the many metasites that may offer incomplete
or misleading information on book pricing, consumers may simply go to
Amazon.com or the Barnes & Noble website. However, with legal restrictions
that force metasites to bargain with the online retailers for information, market
controls will ensure that an efficient number of metasites exist (that is, if inclusion
within those metasites offers the online retailer a benefit). Therefore, legal restric-
tions that limit the pervasiveness of shopbots and their free-reign on the Internet
may actually improve efficiency by allowing an efficient number of metasites to
exist.2
6
19. Id.
20. Id. 7.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. 16.
24. Id.
25. See generally MARC GOBt, EMOTIONAL BRANDING: THE NEW PARADIGM FOR CONNECTING
BRANDS TO PEOPLE (2001).
26. Rosenfeld, supra note 7, 7.
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There is also discussion about the use of mandatory user agreements (MUA)
on websites to efficiently restrict or block shopbots.27 While intuitively it seems
that legal enforceability of a boilerplate MUA would too greatly hinder the free
movement of every entity on the Internet, some argue that the "enforceability of
contracts that restrict shopbots ('robot restriction contracts') will aid in achieving
economic efficiency, rather than hindering its progress."'28 It would be difficult to
enforce, on contractual grounds, a boilerplate agreement that would seem to be
made between a robot and an online retailer.
C. Gray Markets and Entitlements for Data in Cyberspace
If we view commercial data as a product (see discussion of property rights
infra), unauthorized data aggregation on the Internet takes the form of a gray mar-
ket enterprise. A gray market is an unauthorized network for the distribution of a
lawful product. 29 Comparatively, while a product in a black market is itself ille-
gal, "in a gray market it is the means of distributing the product that is the source
of the problem." 30 By its nature "Cyberspace is the locus of gray markets in infor-
mation, ... mean[ing] that Cyberspace permits the creation of unauthorized distri-
bution channels for information and information products." 3 1 Cyberspace, unlike
traditional media of distribution-such as a printing press, telephone/fax machine,
or photocopier--differs because it "provides sizeable reductions in the costs of
producing, distributing, and accessing information. ' 32 As Professor Ghosh pre-
dicts, whenever the costs of copying and dissemination are low, gray markets and
unauthorized distribution channels will arise.33 This forces content owners, for
our purposes online retailers, to look for ways to limit what others can do with the
digital information while trying to maintain open and public access to the informa-
tion.
One prospective limitation might be some sort of intellectual property right in
the data. 34 However, there are three background considerations to keep in mind.
First, for purposes of this analysis, we are not concerned with traditional digital
intellectual property, such as a sound recording or photograph, but instead focus
on digital "information. 35 Certain categories of property are preempted from this
discussion, primarily by copyright law. Second, because digital information is
nonrivalrous, "one person can make use of information without depriving another
of the same use." 36 Unlike the taking of real property that deprives another of its
use altogether, digital information can be copied outside of the owner's knowl-
edge. Lastly, it is considerably less expensive to copy than to create digital infor-
mation, "and digital information is often even cheaper to copy than other forms of
27. Id. 6.
28. Id.
29. Shubha Ghosh, Gray Markets in Cyberspace, 7 J. INTELL. PRop. L. 1, 6 (1999).
30. id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CH. LEGAL F. 217, 218
(1996).
35. Id. at 219.
36. ld. at 219-20.
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information."'37 This makes prohibition and detection of data copying extremely
difficult.
D. Limiting Digital Copying: An Initial Glance at the Possibilities
The question of how to limit copying "is best answered by looking at the
aggregate combination of four factors: 1) entitlement-like protection; 2) contract-
like protection; 3) state-of-the-art limitations; and 4) special-purpose technical limi-
tations." 38 Entitlement-like protection is "the wide recognition that informational
products have an 'owner' and that this owner has some 'rights' that would be vio-
lated by unauthorized copying of the product." 39 These "rights inhere in the prod-
uct or the owner and are binding on the world in general; they are not a matter of
contract."40 Alternatively, contract-like protection "protects information only be-
cause two or more parties have agreed to treat the product as protected."4 1 This
allows the owner to bind those who are party to the contract. 42 Either the contract
is "the means by which an entitlement is used to gain remuneration," or it "creates
the owner's rights or clarifies them in the event that an entitlement is ambigu-
ous." 43
Third, state-of-the-art copying limitations are not relevant to this discussion
because the digital copying of data is inherently simple. The concerns raised about
data aggregation do not involve someone hand writing a list of prices from the
Internet. Rather it involves millions of robotic requests for information and the
publication of the results of those requests to all that have access to the Internet.
Lastly, special-purpose technological restrictions, such as scrambling a signal, can
limit copying. 44 While this appears on its face to have potential, it has proven
more difficult to execute on the Internet than for cable providers.
It is certainly true that "trends in computer communications point to lower
transaction costs overall, and hence favor a property regime for informational
works. ' 45 Professor Hardy argues that "the costs of drawing and monitoring the
boundaries of informational works in cyberspace seem no higher than for works
outside of cyberspace" and that "[i]n some regards, they may even be cheaper."46
This factor argues strongly for either a private property regime47 or an entitlement
protected by a property rule.
Cyberspace also, in effect, creates markets by permitting "bargaining over
distances and time that never before could have been possible." 48 This, in turn,
"lowers the absolute amount of transaction costs relative to the costs of the same
transaction undertaken through some other means." 49 The lowering of costs "oc-
37. Id. at 220.
38. Id. at 223.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41, Id. at 224.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 225.
45. Id. at 236.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 237.
49. Id.
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curs in three ways: (1) lower cost of communicating between people; (2) lower
cost of computer recording of transaction data; and (3) lower communication costs
facilitating institutional innovations like rights clearinghouses."'50 Transaction costs,
therefore, drop significantly for many transactions in relation to traditional trans-
actions in the real world.5 1
However, as Professor Burk argues, "a careful consideration of on-line trans-
actions suggests quite the opposite: not only could transaction costs in cyberspace
be at least as high as those in 'real space,' but transaction costs on-line may in
some instances be higher."'52 Furthermore, in response to Professor Hardy's pri-
vate property arguments, Professor Burk argues that "determining boundaries may
be somewhat trickier than simply looking for the last string of binary code in a
certain computer file."'53 That complication results in higher transaction costs
than expected. 54 It therefore appears likely "that formulating any sensible demar-
cation of intellectual property in cyberspace will be a much higher-cost undertak-
ing than demarcation of intellectual property in physical space-and the latter al-
ready can be a fairly high cost proposition." 55
As commercial activity in cyberspace pushes onward into the frontier, "all
sorts of new and differently valued transactions will be undertaken." 56 The num-
ber and nature "of transactions in cyberspace is thus one of extraordinary dyna-
mism and unpredictability." 57 Faced with unpredictability in future transactions,
"the task is to design an entitlement system in the face of uncertainty...."58 The
choice is between liability rules and property rules, and property rules have the
advantage. 59 As Hardy argues later, "[Iliability rules are appropriate when trans-
action costs are high, not when those costs are unknown or changing." 60 Addi-
tionally, liability rule protection can "carry a high price tag: the cost of litigation
to determine, after the fact, the amount of damages." 6 1 While property rule pro-
tection certainly does not entirely eliminate the threat of litigation, "it does put
parties on notice that bargaining is called for and expected." 62
Costs of administering a private property system in cyberspace, while un-
knowable at this point, may be higher than expected. 6 3 It is true that "practical
problems exist with policing very long borders of real property, but they seem to
pale beside the problem of detecting 'trespass' activities like unauthorized copy-
ing or uses of informational works."64 If, in fact, the costs of administering and
policing "are excessive in cyberspace, they might argue against a private-property
regime because such a regime would not be worth it.' 65
50. Id.
51. Id. at 240.
52. Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDozo L. REV. 121, 145 (1999).
53. Id. at 147.
54. See id. at 152-59.
55. Id. at 152.
56. Hardy, supra note 34, at 240.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 241.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Consider, for example, the costs of harm and policing that the recording industry has
faced over the last decade.
64. Hardy, supra note 34, at 247.
65. Id.
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E. Network-Effect Relationships
As Bill Gates stated, the Internet of the future "'must offer individuals com-
plete control over how and when and what information is delivered to them, and
allow them to protect their privacy and security by controlling who has access to
their personal information.' 66 Likewise, the Internet must also offer online re-
tailers complete control over how and when and what data is taken from them, and
how that data is used in commerce. The dilemma for the future, i.e., "the need to
control competitor access to publicly accessible information-typifies the first re-
lationship between primary and secondary aggregators, the network-effect rela-
tionship.- 67
The network-effect relationship has two primary features.68 The first feature
is public openness: "to attract users to its website, the primary aggregator makes
at least some information on its site easily accessible and searchable by the pub-
lic." 69 The second feature is exploitation: exploiting the public ability to search
the primary's information, the secondary enjoys a positive externality that has no
effect on the network relationship between the primary and the consumer.70 Diffi-
culties arise, however, when "the secondary aggregator threatens to undermine a
network effect on which the primary aggregator significantly depends for rev-
enue.,, 7 1 Protecting the network relationship between the primary and the con-
sumer may be necessary to ensure efficiency; allowing the primary a right to ex-
clude may ensure an efficient result (i.e., primary and secondary are able to bar-
gain over the ability to aggregate).
It is difficult to square a denial of the primary's right to exclude with eco-
nomic efficiency concerns.72 As Professor Warner argues, "[o]ther things being
equal, it is efficient to let the primary aggregator decide if and how it will allocate
its business resources."'73 That is one reason why, "[i]n the brick-and-mortar world,
we put such decisions in the hands of individual market participants ....,-74 Fur-
thermore, "[dienying primaries the right to exclude secondaries could seriously
undermine the incentive to enter into a web business that depends on a positive
network effect for revenue. ' 75 The inability to control use of the data in com-
merce seriously diminishes the incentive to invest in the creation of a publicly
accessible website. 76 And "[i]f investors as primary aggregators lack sufficient
incentive, secondary aggregators will not thrive, and Internet users will not enjoy
the benefits of either one."17
66. Richard Warner, Border Disputes: Trespass to Chattels on the Internet, 47 VILL. L. Rev.
117, 126 (2002) (quoting Bill Gates, Now for an Intelligent Internet, Economist: The World in
2001, 121 (2000), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/ofnote/1 1-17billg.asp).
67. ld at 135. For our purposes, the primary aggregators are the online retailer and the
secondary aggregators are the metasites.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 136.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 137.
77. Id.
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Granting the right to exclude secondaries certainly does not mean "that sec-
ondary aggregators will vanish from network-effect relationships; rather, second-
aries will have to try to negotiate license agreements with the primaries that allow
the latter to search the former's website."'78 It is reasonable to expect that a pri-
mary aggregator would "enter into a license agreement with a secondary aggregator
if the compensation from the license outweighed the risk of an undermined net-
work effect." 79 An assessment of the risk would not hinge solely on critical mass,
because that "is not sufficient to undercut a positive network effect." 80 Instead,
the potential use by the "secondary aggregator must undermine the expectation
that large numbers of people will use the primary aggregator's website. ' ' 8 1 A pri-
mary aggregator would not worry that a secondary aggregator could destroy its
network effect if it was confident about its site's power of attraction.82
Economic efficiency considerations also support the right to exclude. As
mentioned, "[it is efficient to allow primary aggregators to decide if and how they
will allocate their business resources, all other things being equal."' 83 "At the
harm end of no-network-effect relationships, there is no worry that the primary
will use the right to exclude to achieve short-run gains that undermine the interest
in low-cost communication and unimpeded access to information." 84 Instead, "ef-
fective, comprehensive search engines are critical to advancing that interest, and
granting search engines the right to exclude meta-search engines allows search
engines to protect themselves from the meta-search engine threat."'85 Negotiating
for authorization to use online retailers' commercial data may provide the most
efficient means of allowing both online retailers to control their commercial data
and metasites to provide consumers with reduced overall search costs.
F State of the Web
There are "[c]ertain characteristics of electronic markets [that] enhance the
possibility that e-commerce will be conducted in an environment that comes closer
to attaining the perfectly competitive ideal than that of most conventional mar-
kets."'86 As mentioned earlier, the same essential technology that "users already
employ to search the Internet can also enable this retailing revolution by allowing
consumers easily to obtain comparative product and pricing information."'87 Online
retailers, however, have recently begun "asserting a variety of legal claims that, if
successful, will hamper consumers' abilities to use," what Professor O'Rourke
argues, are "the most efficient tools to obtain this information. '88 Professor
O'Rourke further argues that "if courts adjudicating these claims apply existing
property law governing tangible items to Internet activities without considering
that medium's unique nature, they may inadvertently, but nevertheless effectively,
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (emphasis omitted).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 144.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 4, at 1966 (footnote omitted).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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confer upon web site owners exclusive rights to their product and pricing informa-
tion tantamount to ownership."
89
Perfect competition requires, among other things, the costless exchange of
information. 90 However, critics argue that if online merchants have the ability to
"control the most efficient means of access to and the accompanying dissemina-
tion of their product and pricing information, they may impede movement toward
the ideal." 9 1 For a market to be perfectly competitive, it must be "characterized
not only by no barriers to entry or exit, but also homogeneous products and per-
fectly informed buyers and sellers able to meet with each other without incurring
search or other transaction costs."'92 Price must equal "marginal cost, keeping
supply and demand in equilibrium." 93 Most agree that any "change to a market
that brings it closer to perfect competition is generally... desirable. '94 Therefore,
through "decreasing transaction costs and making information more accessible,
search engines help Internet markets to more closely approximate the zero transac-
tion cost and perfect information hallmarks of textbook perfect competition than
'real' world markets.'9 5 The decrease in user costs for identifying retailers of
certain products and finding information about those products "makes Internet
markets more likely to approach perfect competition than conventional ones."
96
This should result in "both lower and more uniform prices." 97 As Professor
O'Rourke points out, the reality is something very different.98
Improvements in search engine capabilities will cause transaction costs to
decline, but with it will come the potential for diminishing brand power.99 Some
commentators predict that the power of the brand "will inevitably wane as users'
trust moves to an intelligent agent personalized for their needs." 100 If these im-
provements cause trust to shift in this direction, "the only brands with value will be
those of the software agent and the manufacturer of the product: [t]he site from
whom the agent makes the ultimate purchase and any others employed by it during
the purchasing process will be transparent to the user."10 1
Online retailers of established brands "are unlikely to be receptive to erosion
of their brands' power." 10 2 The desire on the part of online retailers "to maintain
whatever market power the brand confers explains, at least in part, why some sites
are seeking to control the flow of their product and pricing information." 103 While
"the number of sites objecting to indexing by search engines, particularly metasites,
has increased" recently, most sites formerly "welcomed the search engines as tools
89. Id. at 1966-67.
90. Id. at 1967.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1968.
93. Id. (footnotes omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1969.
96. Id. at 1971-72.
97. Id. at 1972.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1974.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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making it easier for users to find them." 10 4 Online retailers' success in establish-
ing those brand names has consequently, and predictably, led to the decreased need
for search engines. 105 Many of "the best-known sites may prefer that users travel
directly to them rather than first going to a search engine from which they may
choose to go to a competitive site." 106
Some shopbots have respected the requests of online retailers and "search
only sites with whom they have agreements granting permission to index."'1 7 The
value of an incomplete listing of prices to the consumer is patently lower than the
value of a comprehensive one. 108 However, many online retailers argue that even
those metasites claiming to be comprehensive deliver misleading information to
the consumers. For example, metasites do not complete new searches of prices
every time a consumer places a query. Instead, the metasite searches only "against
its own database that is comprised of contents drawn from the web at a specific
time." 109 These updates are, by their nature, not in real-time. Therefore, if an
online retailer, or especially an auction site, has a price change, "a consumer may
receive an old quotation from a shopbot, and be disappointed when he or she tries
to make a purchase only to discover that the quoted price is not the actual one." 110
Vigorous competition presupposes both informed consumers as well as pri-
vate property rights. 111 The private property rights help retailers control the per-
missible means by which customers become informed about the products they
sell. 112 This control keeps consumers imperfectly informed and keeps their infor-
mation costs high. 113 However, metasites also provide incomplete or misleading
information, not because of restrictions imposed by online retailers, but because it
would be impractical for the metasite to search the entire Internet for prices each
time a consumer made a query. Likewise, it is inefficient for metasites to provide
partial or outdated information because it misinforms the consumer and harms the
online retailer's reputation. Consumers may, and often do, "blame the destination
site for the discrepancy rather than the shopbot, eroding the destination site's good-
will."1l14
The advertising value of an online retailer's site is also diminished by the use
of metasites. Rates for advertising obviously depend on the number of visitors to
the site. 115 However, when metasites provide a deep link to a product page, "the
chances that the user will travel to the site on which the ad appears may decrease,
thereby lowering the destination site's advertising revenue." 116 Empirical data
also demonstrates "that advertisers are increasingly using their money to place ads
on specialized sites tailored to the interests of their target markets."1 17
104. Id. at 1975.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1978-79.
110. Id. at 1979.
111. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of
an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561, 599 (2001) [hereinafter O'Rourke, Prop-
erty Rights].
112. Id.
113. Id. at 608.
114. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition, supra note 4, at 1979.
115. Id. at 1982.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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As Professor O'Rourke claims, "the law should critically examine claims that
unauthorized indexing constitutes impermissible free-riding on the indexed site's
information simply because it undercuts a site's source of revenue." 118 Law is
typically only "concerned with free-riding when it threatens the incentive to create
and market the original product (as in the case of-piracy or close similarity) than
when it does not (as when the free-rider adds substantial value)."1 19 In the case of
data aggregation, however, the free-riding causes online retailers to expend re-
sources on the "technological arms race" rather than on creating primary data.
Online retailers "argue that this arms race is not the best use of resources. ' 120 The
job of law, therefore, is to weigh the benefits that metasites provide against the
costs incurred by the online retailers (and arguably the consumers), and choose an
appropriate entitlement/protection.
Online retailers may effectively stop even lawful use of uncopyrightable data
because "[i]mpermissible access contaminates any use, even those the copyright
law would allow. ' 12 1 Online retailers may block unauthorized use by "require[ing]
all visitors to agree to a click-wrap contract that enumerates forbidden uses."
122
As mentioned earlier, there are problems with this approach. A spider, by its na-
ture, bypasses much of the superficial information on, for example, the homepage
of the website. A spider, therefore, "may never see the contractual terms. Its
manner of entry may allow it to avoid clicking on the 'I agree' button that indicates
its consent to the terms of the click-wrap." 123 Or if it does click on the button, it
would be difficult to prove a meeting of the minds between the spider and the
online retailer.
The technological advances provided with the advent of Internet technology
have provided a great boon to e-commerce. The control of commercial data is a
contentious topic. The preceding section provided a broad overview of the issues.
Next, we turn to an examination and application of traditional economic efficiency
theories.
III. EFFICIENCY
A. Efficiency v. Equity
Discussions of e-commerce and rights on the Internet often hinge on concepts
of efficiency and equity. On the one hand, efficiency refers "to the relationship
between the aggregate benefits of a situation and the aggregate costs of the situa-
tion." 124 Equity, on the other hand, refers "to the distribution of income among
individuals. ' 125 Simply put, "efficiency corresponds to 'the size of the pie,' while
118. Id. at 1983.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1985.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1999 (emphasis omitted).
123. Id.
124. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcoNoMics 7 (2d. ed. 1989).
125. Id.
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equity has to do with how it is sliced." 126 For example, from an efficiency per-
spective, an individual that discovers oil underneath the earth maximizes the size
of the pie; an individual who finds one million dollars in paper money does not.
This is true because "[f]inding money does not increase the wealth of society; it
just enables the finder to have more of society's goods than someone else." 127
Alternatively, a decision based on equity would choose how to divide the oil if it
were discovered in a common pool by multiple parties.
For the central economic analysis of data aggregation, this Article will, as
Professor Polinsky argues, "concentrate on how to maximize the size of the pie,
leaving to others-such as legislators-the decision how to divide it."1 28 While
fairness is often an important consideration for the legal system, the "conflict be-
tween the pursuit of efficiency and the pursuit of equity" is worth mentioning only
briefly. 129 If, as Professor Polinsky suggests, "the pie can be sliced in any way
desired, then clearly there is no conflict-with a bigger pie, everyone can get a
bigger piece." 130 However, if in the pursuit of creating a bigger pie "its division
must be quite unequal, then, depending on what constitutes an equitable division
of the pie, there may well be a conflict between efficiency and equity."131 Under
such circumstances the law or polity may prefer that a party "accept a smaller pie
(less efficiency) in return for a fairer division (more equity)."' 132 The resolution of
the efficiency and equity conflict "depends on how important efficiency is relative
to equity."13 3 For purposes of this Article, efficiency trumps equity in importance;
but because both issues become intertwined in decisions about legal regimes we
will consider both when applicable.
B. Kaldor-Hicks Wealth Maximization
The economic implications of a change in law "is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the
new outcome makes those who benefit sufficiently well off that they would still
end up with an increase in utility even if they compensated the losers enough to
make the losers indifferent." 134 However, a major problem with the abstract form
of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion "is that it requires a detailed knowledge of the pref-
erence functions (i.e., indifference curves) of every member of society." 135 In
response to this difficulty, "some economists, and the law and economics move-
ment in particular, have posited a closely related measure of efficiency, called
'wealth maximization."' ' 136
The trade-off of utility required under Kaldor-Hicks, which is so difficult to
determine, is replaced under the wealth maximization model with monetary value
or wealth measurements. 137 Using this model, for a legal change to be efficient it
126. Id.
127. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOmiC ANALYSIS OF LAW 42 (5th ed. 1998).
128. POLINSKY, supra note 124, at 7.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 7-8.
131. Id. at 8.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 54-55 (1996).
135. Id. at 55.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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must increase the winner's wealth more than it decreases the loser's wealth. 138
While it is certainly "still difficult to account for all the ways in which a change in
a legal rule makes members of society better or worse off," monetary value or
wealth is a far more recognizable and tangible determinant for a court than the
abstract utility.139 Furthermore, "wealth maximization takes as its measure of
efficiency value determined by individuals' willingness and ability to pay." 140
Wealth maximization, therefore, "justifies outcomes that depend greatly on the
initial distribution of wealth with which society starts."'14 1
However, by using monetary value as the determinant, wealth maximization
does not take into account the value of the dollar to the individual, but rather the
value to society as a whole. In other words, "wealth maximization equates the
value of a dollar to one person with the value of a dollar to another, regardless of
whether the first person needs that dollar to buy food to keep from starving while
the second person already has millions of dollars." 142 This compounds distribu-
tional problems, and often competitive and market entry difficulties, "by allowing
individuals with wealth to determine how legal entitlements are assigned, without
these individuals ever having to pay for the entitlement." 14 3
This is especially pertinent to issues of e-commerce. With strongly estab-
lished brands controlling much cyber-wealth, 144 market entry becomes more dif-
ficult for those wishing to compete. Any legal rule must therefore ensure that
while increasing the size of the pie it does not promote inefficient monopolistic
control and prohibit healthy competition on the web; this would be accomplished
by encouraging bargaining between parties.
C. Costs of Harm: The Efficiency of Incentive Models of
Precaution and Compensation
In e-commerce, as with all other types of trade, parties and legal institutions
are concerned with allocating the costs of harm. 145 Specifically, in terms of data
aggregation, a metasite undertaking data aggregation can cause harm to the pri-
mary site, primarily by using too much bandwidth and slowing down the network,
or by disseminating inaccurate or untimely information. Such activity can be char-
acterized as a quasi-nuisance. It is important, therefore, to discuss models of pre-
caution and compensation in relation to data aggregation.
Allocative cost rules are justified by two distinct goals: "the equity goal of
compensating victims and the efficiency goal of minimizing costs to society as a
whole." 146 Two principles can be derived from these seemingly distinct goals:
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 55-56.
142. Id. at 56.
143. Id.
144. For example, Amazon.com, eBay, Yahoo!, WalMart.com.
145. Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Properry: A Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L.
REv. 1, 1 (1985).
146. Id. (citing GuIDo CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF AcciDENTs 24 (1970); Guido Calabresi, About
Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553 (1980)) (emphasis
omitted).
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"the compensation principle and the marginal principle."' 147 First, the compensa-
tion principle dictates that the victim "be compensated for harm caused by oth-
ers." 148 Second, the marginal principle dictates that social costs are "minimized
by equating the incremental benefit of each precautionary activity to its incremen-
tal cost."'14 9 Harm, therefore, can be compensated before the fact by adjusting
prices to reflect the cost of precaution and/or after the fact by compensating the
injured party. The distinction depends on the liability of the parties.
In the examination of costs surrounding data aggregation on the Internet, the
direct cost of harm and the cost of precautions against harm are both worthy of
analysis. 150 Professor Cooter argues that the common law combines the compen-
sation and marginal principles in a harmonious fashion. For example, "there are
circumstances in which compensation is required for reasons of justice and [there
are] mechanisms that attempt to provide compensation, without undermining in-
centives for efficient behavior." 151 In other words, these two principles, instead of
existing in rivalry, can actually complement each other without causing under-
precaution or over-compensation. 152
1. Double Responsibility at the Margin
Compensation can influence the victim not to internalize possible externali-
ties, and thus not take efficient precautions to avoid harm. Double responsibility
at the margin, or the imposition of full responsibility for harm on both the injurer
and the victim, purports to eliminate that problem of under-precaution. 15 3 For
instance, in the example of the polluting factory and neighboring laundry, "justice
may require the factory not only to pay for harm caused by the smoke, but also to
compensate the laundry for that harm." 154 In this example, compensation com-
promises efficiency by permitting the laundry to externalize its costs instead of
taking precautions against the harm. 155 A paradox therefore results: "If the fac-
tory can pollute with impunity, harm is externalized by the factory; if the factory
must pay full compensation, harm is externalized by the laundry; if compensation
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2. As Professor Cooter writes:
The "model of precaution" is my label for an account of the relationship between
these two types of costs.
There is justification in terms of economic theory for developing the model of
precaution before considering other types of indirect costs. An economic model is
built up by mathematical deduction from axioms describing the behavior of individu-
als and organizations. This axiomatic structure contains an accepted order of simpli-
fication, which is dictated by the internal structure of economic reasoning. Following
this order, the simplest level of analysis assumes away the costs of risk aversion, the
costs of obtaining information about risk, and the transaction costs of dispute resolu-
tion. Thus, the model of precaution is basic in terms of the internal structure of eco-
nomic reasoning. Furthermore,... the model of precaution is similar in structure for
torts, contracts, and property.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
151. Id. at 1-2.
152. Id. at 1.
153. Id. at 4.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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is partial, harm is partly externalized by the factory and partly externalized by the
laundry." 156 Internalization never occurs for both parties if full responsibility is
imposed on only one party or partial responsibility is parceled out. 157 Therefore,
no level of "just" or "non-wasteful" compensation can achieve the efficiency of
double responsibility at the margin. 158
In situations where efficiency demands bilateral precaution, which perhaps is
likely in cyberspace, strict liability (without contributory negligence) in a frac-
tional form is inefficient. Technically, "when efficiency requires bilateral precau-
tion, strict liability for any fraction of the harm, from zero percent to 100 percent,
is inefficient."'159 Therefore, formulating a legal regime that combines "compen-
sation for harm with incentives for efficient precaution" is patently difficult. 160
To be efficient, both parties must "balance the cost of further precaution against
the consequent reduction in harm and ... act accordingly.' ' 16 1 Only when each
party is individually liable for the cost of harm is there an incentive for the parties
to act accordingly. 162 Efficiency in data aggregation, therefore, may require double
responsibility at the margin. 163
As mentioned earlier, this is where courts often misbalance equity and effi-
ciency by construing that justice requires the injurer to compensate the victim; the
compensation alters the incentives of both parties to act efficiently. 164 Therefore,
by reducing the foreseeable cost of harm, "the victim may be encouraged to take
too little precaution and rely instead on compensation to make him whole." '165
As this explains, developing a legal rule that combines the justice of compen-
sation with the efficiency of precautionary incentives is difficult. 166 In the realm
of data aggregation, a legal rule should give the incentive to the victim to develop
technology to help prevent the injury and give the incentive to the injurer to get
authorization to gather information. The rule should also allow the victim to re-
ceive compensation from the injurer if identification is possible or suffer without
compensation if identification is not possible. The victim will act without know-
ing whether compensation will be possible and the injurer will act under the belief
that compensation will always be granted. Following these four guidelines a legal
rule may be developed to ensure that there is double responsibility at the margin.
2. Party Negotiations and Coercive Orders
If government regulation is necessary, efficiency dictates that regulators "adopt
methods that alter incentives and redirect information instead of issuing commands,
so that affected parties can work out the best course of action among themselves." 167
Under this approach, parties view nuisances, for example, "as a subject for private
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 44.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 26.
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bargaining, a view that has been developed at length in the continuing commen-
tary on the Coase Theorem." 16 8 This view works on the theory "that private bar-
gaining among a small number of people with well-defined rights usually has an
efficient outcome."' 169 Parties are better able to understand their own situations
and work out an efficient solution, especially when the parties may work together
in the future. In e-commerce, it is likely that, given the murkiness of the law and
unpredictability of the commercial environment, a metasite that is "stealing" in-
formation from an online retailer one day may negotiate a licensure or authoriza-
tion deal the next.
One common legal mechanism that combines efficient precaution incentives
with compensatory justice is a coercive court order, such as a nuisance injunc-
tion. 170 While economists remain unenthusiastic about coercive orders, such or-
ders can enable an efficient outcome if "used as a bargaining chip rather than actu-
ally exercised." 17 1 Although the entrance of a coercive order, which typically
signals the breakdown of negotiations, may not result in an efficient outcome, the
right to obtain a coercive order may be a bargaining solution and "bargaining solu-
tions have desirable economic properties." 172 The right of injunction may enable
a victim "to achieve adequate compensation by private agreement with the injurer,
and the parties to the bargain will desire to make its terms efficient."1 73 This is
likely the best route for solving e-commerce disputes given that those involved in
the industry will have a better idea of how to bargain to an efficient solution in the
cyber-realm than a court would in entering an order.
D. Reciprocity of Harm and the Coase Theorem
The Coase Theorem, set forth by Professor Coase in The Problem of Social
Cost, is important to this examination because "the lessons of Coase's Theorem
apply to every possible legal rule which we might economically evaluate." 174 One
of the major theories put forth by Professor Coase that is relevant to this discussion
is reciprocity of harm. 175 As Professor Coase wrote, "[tihe question is commonly
thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is: how
should we restrain A? ' 176 But restraint of A is not the answer because "[wie are
dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature."'177 Restraining the harm A inflicts
on B likewise inflicts a harm on A. 178 The appropriate question, therefore, is
"should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? ' 179 To answer
168. Id.
169. Id. ("Experimental evidence also suggests that breakdowns are rare in two-person bar-
gaining games with clear stakes but are more common when several people must agree."). Id.
170. Id. at 28.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. SEIDENFELD, supra note 134, at 91.
175. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960) [hereinafter Coase,
Social Cost].
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that question one must determine which harm is less serious. 180 It therefore "goes
almost without saying that this problem has to be looked at in total and at the
margin."18
1
In cases where market transactions are costless, well-defined rights and easily
forecastable legal results are all that is needed to ensure efficiency. 182 One pur-
pose for the legal system's involvement in policing economic activities "is to es-
tablish that clear delimitation of rights on the basis of which the transfer and re-
combination of rights can take place through the market. ' 183 As mentioned ear-
lier, legal delimitations of rights have a reciprocal impact: "there is no analytical
difference between the right to use a resource without direct harm to others and the
right to conduct operations in such a way as to produce direct harm to others."'184
That is to say that in either instance something granted to one party is being denied
to the other.185 By suppressing the harm which A inflicts on B, the court inevita-
bly inflicts harm on A. 186 The court is therefore charged with avoiding the more
serious harm in delimiting the rights of the parties. 187
It is really only after the parties' legal rights are established that "negotiation
is possible to modify the arrangements envisaged in the legal ruling, if the likeli-
hood of being able to do so makes it worthwhile to incur costs involved in negotia-
tion." 188 As an essential precursor to market transactions, the delimitation of rights
settles a primary power dispute and allows parties to bargain. 189 The ultimate
outcome-that value-maximizing transaction-remains "independent of the legal
decision."'190 In the ultimate delimitation of legal rights, the court must under-
stand that "[a]ll property rights interfere with the ability of people to use re-
sources." 19 1 Needless to say, the optimum situation is not necessarily "one in
which there is no interference. ' 192 The optimum solution is, instead, reached when
"the gain from interference more than offsets the harm it produces.' ' 193 This goal
is therefore of paramount importance in deciding which choice of law to apply to
data aggregation.
For data aggregation, we must first determine which harm is less serious: the
harm inflicted by the data aggregation or the harm in allowing the online retailers
to block such activity. If the harm of the data aggregation is greater-that is, the
gain by the metasite does not offset the harm caused to the online retailer and
affected customers-the online retailer must have the right to prohibit such activ-
ity without authorization. If, on the other hand, the harm of prohibiting the data
aggregation-that is, the gain by the online retailer in blocking the metasite does
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 19.
183. Coase, FCC, supra note 1, at 25.
184. Id. at 26.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id.
188. Id. at 26-27.
189. See id. at 27.
190. Id.
191. See id.
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not offset the harm such a prohibition causes the metasite and affected custom-
ers-the metasite must have the right to aggregate the data. The purpose, as stated
earlier, is to create the bigger pie, not to decide on how it should be divided.
IV. CHOICE OF LAW
A. Property Law and Communal Ownership
One possibility to address the data aggregation situation is to use property
law.194 Commercial data, with its intrinsic value as more than just a fact, may
(and I stress may) have some intellectual property characteristics. Unlike mere
facts, which we rely upon as communal property in everyday life but which exist
no matter what we do, commercial data must be produced. Society wants, as in
this case, online retailers to create and give public access to this data. Much like
copyright we want the data created; like patent law we want it widely disseminated
(under controlled circumstances); and like trademark we want it to ease consumers
in their search. Under these liberal assumptions of intellectual property, we will
examine the possibilities of a property right in commercial data, both communally
and individually owned.
One of the primary efficiency tenets of property law is that "legal protection
of property rights creates incentives to exploit resources efficiently."1 95 In fact,
while a product's value, "as measured by consumers' willingness to pay, may have
greatly exceeded its cost in labor, materials, and forgone alternative uses..., with-
out property rights there is no incentive to incur these costs because there is no
reasonably assured reward for incurring them." 196 Property rights, through the
right to exclude, provide the owner with the security and expectations that foster
productive use by substantially limiting risk.
For application of property rights to the situation surrounding data aggrega-
tion, it is necessary to view property ownership as permitting certain activity. In
other words, the owner of the data "possesses the consent of fellowmen to allow
him to act in particular ways." 197 That owner also has an expectation that the
community will "prevent others from interfering with his actions, provided that
these actions are not prohibited in the specifications of his rights." 198 However, it
is also important to view current law pertaining to this type of factual data in the
public domain. From that point, we may analyze the status of the property right in
the factual data as communal. 199
194. Property is an acceptable analogy for an economic analysis of law surrounding digital
data; some economists "use the term property right to describe virtually every device-public or
private, common law or regulatory, contractual or governmental, formal or informal-by which
divergences between private and social costs or benefits are reduced." POSNER, supra note 127,
at 53. Digital data certainly fits into that definition.
195. Id. at 36.
196. Id.
197. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REV. 347, 347
(1967).
198. Id.
199. While the "copying" of digital data does not have the same effect that communal use of
property might because the use is nonrivalrous, the dissemination of time-sensitive information
dilutes its value in an analogous manner.
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Informational works on the Internet, which data aggregation primarily involves,
are communal property: "a type of 'public good,' that is, a good that evidences
'nonrivalrous consumption.' 200 In fact, one person may use the data without
physically impeding on another's, simultaneous use.20 1 As Professor Hardy points
out, "once group ownership of an informational work has been determined, the
group should not have to experience any transaction costs at all."'20 2 In that cir-
cumstance, "[e]ach member of the group can fully exercise all rights to the infor-
mational work without fear that other group members are in any way excluded
from doing the same." '203
1. Right to Exclude
As mentioned, for a property ownership system to ensure the efficient use of
property, owners must have the right to exclusive use. For this analysis, I liken
information in the public domain (i.e., that data not falling within existing copy-
right protection) to Judge Posner's example of a pasture owned in common.2° 4
As more cows are brought to pasture on the commonly owned land, "[tihe
cows will have to graze more in order to eat the same amount of grass, and this will
reduce their weights." 205 However, "because none of the farmers pays for the use
of the pasture, none will take this cost into account in deciding how many addi-
tional cows to pasture, with the result that more cows will be pastured than would
be efficient."206 The problem of overuse, which exists because there is no incen-
tive to act otherwise, "would disappear if one person owned the pasture and charged
each farmer for its use (for purposes of this analysis, disregard the cost of levying
such a charge). ' ' 207 The right to exclude allows the owner to levy a charge against
each farmer, which "would include the cost he imposes on the other farmers by
pasturing additional cows, because that cost reduces the value of the pasture to the
other farmers and hence the price they are willing to pay the owner for the right to
graze." '20 8 As this example shows, creating "individual (as distinct from collec-
tive) ownership rights is a necessary rather than a sufficient condition for the effi-
cient use of resources. ' 209
In the case of data aggregation, overuse has a similar deleterious effect. While
the data is not physically occupied by the metasites, the dissemination of the data
dilutes its value. The value to the online retailer of the exclusive use of its data,
and the value to the consumer, is depleted by metasite dissemination in several
ways.
First, the accuracy of the information is not controlled by metasites in real-
time. Metasites update information at scheduled intervals rather than at the mo-
ment of a user's query. This may translate into the online retailer losing the good-
200. Hardy, supra note 34, at 254.
201. Id.
202. Id,
203. Id.
204. POSNER, supra note 127, at 37.
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will it has built up with its customers. If, for example, Metasite Y shows that Site
X is selling a product for $10, but, due to a price change not reported by Metasite
Y, the consumer clicks through to Site X and discovers the product is for sale for
$15, the consumer may think poorly of Site X. This will be detrimental to Site X's
goodwill value. On the other hand, the consumer may lose confidence in Metasite
Y, but that will not necessarily send the consumer directly to Site X. What it will
do is increase the information costs of the consumer.
Second, the online retailer loses the value of its data to attract advertising
revenue. If Site X attracts one million people to its site everyday because it is the
exclusive provider of its own data, that attraction of consumers translates directly
into the marketability of advertising space on Site X. However, if Metasite Y is
able to disseminate the same information, and the information of many of the other
competitors, Site X will lose the advertising value as fewer people click through
its site.
Third, the online retailer, and arguably the consumer, will lose that value of
showing the consumer other products as the consumer navigates through the site.
Metasites often utilize deep links, which are hyperlinks that lead directly to the
product page, bypassing the entryway and aisles of the site. Much like a grocery
store strategically places items for impulse buying, so too do online retailers. The
loss of this value to the online retailer is equal to the loss of possible sales from
consumer navigation.
Lastly, the online retailer loses the ability to sell or license the data that it
produces. Even if the online retailer wishes its information to be included on a
particular metasite, because metasites are able to take the data without compensat-
ing the online retailers, there is no economic incentive to seek a license. Instead
the online retailer loses the value of selling or licensing its data to metasites or
other interested parties. A right to exclude would reverse that situation, creating a
market for the bargaining between online retailers and metasites for data.
2. Transferability
The ability to transfer property rights is also necessary to ensure the efficient
use of property.2 10 Returning to the agrarian example, suppose the property owner
farms his own land, but is a bad farmer; obviously "his land would be more pro-
ductive in someone else's hands." 211 In such an instance, "[e]fficiency requires a
mechanism by which the farmer can be induced to transfer the property to some-
one who can work it more productively."2 12 The most obvious and efficient ex-
ample of this type of mechanism is a transferable property right.2 13
While communal property is often able to be transferred, it is more often too
inefficient due to exorbitant negotiating costs. Negotiating costs are high because
with many owners it is difficult "to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement, espe-
cially when each hold-out has the right to work the land as fast as he pleases."'214
A single owner "will attempt to maximize its present value by taking into account
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. Demsetz, supra note 197, at 355.
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alternative future time streams of benefits and costs and selecting that one which
he believes will maximize the present value of his privately-owned... rights." 2 15
Under communal ownership, because of the difficulty in assessing what might
happen in the future given the greater variables, "[t]he effects of a person's activi-
ties on his neighbors and on subsequent generations will not be taken into account
fully."2 16 Communal ownership of property therefore results in greater externali-
ties.217 This is because "[tlhe full costs of the activities of an owner of a commu-
nal property right are not borne directly by him, nor can they be called to his
attention easily by the willingness of others to pay him an appropriate sum."'2 18
With data aggregation, the body-politic of communal owners of public data is
so vast that it is impossible to get everyone's consent to transfer. This is because
anyone has the right to holdout or disseminate the information freely. Unlike a
plot of land, the boundaries of communally held data are difficult to trace or con-
trol. So too are the owners themselves. Therefore, communal ownership of data
creates negotiating costs that make controlled transfer impossible.
It is difficult, if not impossible, "to see how the existing communal owners
can reach an agreement that takes account of these costs. ' 2 19 Furthermore, "be-
cause the owner of a communal right cannot exclude others from enjoying the
fruits of his efforts and because negotiation costs are too high for all to agree jointly
on optimal behavior," the wealth, or in this case value, maximization of the prop-
erty will disregard those many costs.220 Alternatively, private rights that permit an
"owner to economize on the use of those resources from which he has the right to
exclude others" would lead to an efficient use of the data.22 1
3. Use Regulation
To revive one of Professor Coase's examples, "whether we have the right to
shoot over another man's land has been thought of as depending on who owns the
airspace over the land."'222 Referring to the "allocation" of airwaves, Professors
Merrill and Smith described the problem in this way: "What does not seem to
have been understood is that what is being allocated ... is the right to use a piece
of equipment to transmit signals in a particular way," not a property right in the
airwaves. 223
Looking at the question in this way reveals that "it is unnecessary to think in
terms of ownership of frequencies or the ether."'224 Professor "Coase's preference
for defining property rights in terms of permitted uses was . . . revealed in the
starkest possible terms" in his 1959 article. 225 Professor Coase rightfully "thought
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 356.
221. Id.
222. Coase, FCC, supra note 1, at 34 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 85 (1941);
Stuart S. Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 631 (1928); Emory
H. Niles, The Present Status of the Ownership of Airspace, 5 AIR L. REV. 132 (1934)).
223. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Econom-
ics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 372 (2001) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted).
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225. Id.
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it was unduly complicated to try to describe a landowner's rights in terms of a
general rule about the right of the owner to exclude intrusions by strangers from a
delimited space-the traditional in rem approach." 226 Instead, it was "[f]ar better
to draw up a list of permissible uses of a gun."'227
The same is true for data aggregation. It is not necessary that a legal rule
create a specific property right in the data created by online retailers and made
available for public view. That would very well be preempted by copyright law,
and fall under fair use or public domain. Instead, a legal rule could be fashioned to
restrict the usage of technologies, such as spiders or bots, to collect and dissemi-
nate the data without authorization. 228 In a frontier as vast as cyberspace, this
appears to be a more efficient rule than developing a new property right. The
problem that it creates, which will not be addressed in this Article, is a problem of
jurisdiction.
B. Nuisance Law
A nuisance dispute is, as Professors Merrill and Smith note, "a notoriously
murky issue that belongs as much to tort as to property law."'229 There are two
steps involved in resolving a nuisance dispute. 230 The first step involves choosing
an entitlement; in other words, deciding who is entitled to prevail. 231 For ex-
ample, an injurer may be granted an entitlement giving her the right to engage in
the harmful activity or the victim may be granted an entitlement giving her the
right to be free from the harm.232
The second step involves deciding how the entitlement will be protected. 233
There are two possibilities in protecting an entitlement. 234 The first possibility "is
to grant the holder of the entitlement an injunction.' 235 A victim holding an en-
titlement protected by an injunction "can prohibit the injurer from causing harm." 236
Therefore, an injurer is only able to cause damage by buying off the victim.237
Alternatively, an injurer holding an entitlement protected by an injunction can pro-
hibit the victim from stopping the injury.238 In this instance, the victim must pay
the injurer to reduce the damages the victim suffers. 239
The second possibility "is to give the holder of the entitlement an amount of
money-damages-that some governmental body, such as a court, determines."' 240
Under this system, a victim with an entitlement "has the right to be compensated,
226. Id. at 372-73.
227. Id. at 373.
228. The most efficient method would be an entitlement to have the robot exclusion header
respected.
229. Merrill & Smith, supra note 223, at 371.
230. POLINSKY, supra note 124, at 15 (citing Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Prop.
erty Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1972)).
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but he cannot prohibit the injurer from causing harm as he could under an injunc-
tive remedy." 24 1 Likewise, if the injurer is the holder of the entitlement, the "dam-
age remedy would mean that the victim could restrict the injurer's activity but
would have to compensate the injurer for the injurer's 'damages' (for example,
forgone profits)."'242
The profit maximization, or increasing the size of the pie, under "the nuisance
law example is equivalent to maximizing the [injurer's] ... profits net of the...
[victim's] damages."'24 3 However, strategic behavior can cause an inefficient out-
come to be reached. 244 To overcome such strategic behavioral obstacles under an
injunctive remedy, the entitlement chosen must correspond to the efficient out-
come. 245 This could take the form of an absolute or intermediate injunction, de-
pending on the situation.
Information is the key to fashioning an appropriate protection and entitlement
that leads to an efficient solution. 246 For an injunctive remedy, the court obvi-
ously must know what the efficient outcome would be in order "to choose an en-
titlement corresponding to it."247 Likewise, "under the damage remedy, the court
needs to know the resident's damages to set liability equal to actual damages." '248
Under a scenario where the liability equals the actual damage suffered, "the dam-
age remedy leads to the efficient outcome if, and only if, the entitlement is at or
below the efficient output."'249 Additionally, where "the parties can be expected to
bargain cooperatively (and there are no other transaction costs), then every choice
of entitlement and remedy will be efficient."'2 50 However, if the court has ad-
equate information, the efficient outcome can be achieved even where the parties
act strategically.25
1
Under the injunctive remedy, strategic behavior can be thwarted "by choosing
the entitlement that corresponds to the efficient outcome, which can be determined
only if the court knows the injurer's benefits from engaging in the harmful activity
and the victim's damages."' 252 Likewise, under the damages remedy, "by giving
an absolute entitlement to the victim and setting liability equal to actual damages,
which obviously requires knowledge of the victim's damages" strategic behavior
can be overcome. 253 However, if the court is only able to determine "the victim's
damages, the injunctive remedy generally will fail because the court cannot accu-
rately set the entitlement equal to the efficient outcome, but the damage remedy
still can guarantee the efficient outcome."'254 An underestimation by the court as
241. Id. at 16 (citing Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970)).
242. Id. ("This last combination-entitling the injurer to damages-is very unconventional,
but it has been used.").
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to the victim's damages, under a damages remedy, can "generally .- . lead to ex-
cessive output and may be less desirable than the injunctive remedy."25 5
As discussed earlier, because harm is reciprocal the courts must look at the
situation as a whole to come to an efficient resolution. Therefore, in order "to
attain an optimum allocation of resources" the law should influence both parties to
take into account the harmful effect in deciding on their course of action.256 This
lends credence to the earlier discussion of double responsibility at the margin.
Parties should, for example, be made to realize that in a smoothly operating pric-
ing system "the fall in the value of production due to harmful effect would be a
cost for both parties." 257 This is especially true in the case of data aggregation
where the metasites are entirely reliant on the online retailers to produce the pri-
mary data, and the online retailers are, to differing extents, reliant on the metasites
to lower consumer search costs and provide publicity.
Nuisance law may play an interesting role in the resolution of data aggrega-
tion. Without creating a new intellectual property right, the activity of data
aggregators may be controlled. The threat of injunctive relief, instead of dam-
ages,258 would spark negotiation between metasites and the online retailers. Prob-
lems arise in determining just what constitutes a nuisance, or quasi-nuisance, in
this context. How many searches are too many? What type of robotic activity is
acceptable? The most likely form of nuisance law would allow online retailers to
seek injunctive relief if a metasite ignores a posted robot exclusion header. This, it
seems, would avoid the problems produced with the creation of a new property
right.
V. ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF CHOICES OF LAW
A. Externalities and Internalization
A harmful or beneficial effect converts into an externality when "the cost of
bringing the effect to bear on the decisions of one or more of the interacting per-
sons is too high to make it worthwhile" for the parties to create a market. 259 The
internalization of such effects is "a process, usually a change in property rights,
that enables these effects to bear (in greater degree) on all interacting persons."'260
From an efficiency perspective, one "primary function of property rights is that of
guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities." 26 1 To make
costs and benefits externalities, the cost of the transaction "must exceed the gains
from internalization. 262
The costs of transacting may "be large relative to gains because of 'natural'
difficulties in trading or they can be large because of legal reasons. '263 To illus-
255. Id.
256. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 175, at 13.
257. Id.
258. Damages would be too difficult to calculate because of the difficulty in determining
what data was taken, when it was taken, and to whom it was distributed-balanced against who
else might have taken and disseminated it-and determining the actual harm caused.
259. Demsetz, supra note 197, at 348.
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trate a legal reason, we will use the example of the right to one's own labor versus
the right to slave ownership. If a law "establishes the right of a person to his
freedom," that law also "necessitate[s] a payment on the part of a firm .. suffi-
cient to cover the cost of using that person's labor if his services are to be ob-
tained."'264 Under this law, management internalizes the costs of labor.265 On the
other hand, if a law gives management title to the labor of another, that law also
requires the slaveowner to "take into account the sums that slaves are willing to
pay for their freedom." 266 In both examples, the costs are internalized in the deci-
sions. 267 The only thing that is needed for internalization in either case is owner-
ship, including the right of sale.268
Private ownership of property internalizes many of the costs related to com-
munal ownership, as discussed earlier, because the owner, "by virtue of his power
to exclude others, can generally count on realizing the rewards associated with"
increasing the value of the property. 269 Concentrating the benefits and costs upon
a single owner will create the incentive to more efficiently utilize the resource. 270
Costs will thereby be greatly reduced for negotiating the remaining externalities. 27 1
As discussed earlier, because communal ownership of property allows anyone
to use the property, communal ownership creates the need for communal agree-
ment; all must reach an agreement on a controlled use.272 However, not all own-
ers internalize all of the externalities that accompany ownership of the property,
which results in inefficient, splintered uses. This is especially true for data aggre-
gation, where metasites are little concerned with the effect of overuse on the value
of the data to the online retailer. Through private ownership, however, "[t]he cost
of negotiating an internalization of these effects is thereby reduced considerably." 27 3
An online retailer having complete control over the dissemination of its data would
allow it to internalize all of the externalities because the costs and benefits affect
only her business. Only a private owner of data, publicly available on the Internet,
can internalize the externality of overuse of that specific type of resource.
With private ownership comes additional externalities for the broader internet
community to internalize. Difficulties in deciphering what is protected data and
what is in the public domain creates an atmosphere in which parties are unable to
internalize because they are unable to recognize the external costs. The cost of
precaution skyrockets because the information costs of determining what is fair
and what is protected "property" are too high in relation to the benefits. The gains
of internalization, in other words, do not outweigh the costs of internalization. A
property right, therefore, may not be appropriate in the case of digital data.
264. Id. at 349.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 356.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 356-57.
20041
MAINE LAW REVIEW
B. New Property Rights
As Professor Demsetz wrote, "[c]hanges in knowledge result in changes in
production functions, market values, and aspirations. New techniques, new ways
of doing the same things, and doing new things-all invoke harmful and beneficial
effects to which society has not been accustomed." 274 Such is the case with many
aspects of the Internet and digital technology. However, as Professor Demsetz
also noted, "the emergence of new property rights takes place in response to the
desires of the interacting persons for adjustment to new benefit-cost possibilities. ' 275
In such new frontiers, "property rights develop to internalize externalities when
'the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization. '276 New
forms of property and property rights emerge "in response to changes in technol-
ogy and relative prices." 277
With this in mind, I draw a parallel between the current situation of data ag-
gregation and Professor Demsetz's recount of Eleanor Leacock's memoir, The
Montagnes "Hunting Territory" and the Fur Trade.278 In her writing, "Leacock
clearly established the fact that a close relationship existed... between the devel-
opment of private rights in land and the development of the commercial fur
trade."'279 For European fur traders coming to North America, the abundance of
furbearing animals had a new market effect: fur became easier for the hunters to
capture. The externality that prompted the adjustment in property rights was the
over-hunting of game.280 In this new market situation, "[b]ecause of the lack of
control over hunting by others, it [was] in no person's interest to invest in increas-
ing or maintaining the stock of game. ' 281 The anticipated effect, and the norma-
tive standard by which to judge a successful hunt, was intensive over-hunting. 282
In this situation, "a successful hunt is viewed as imposing external costs on subse-
quent hunters-costs that are not taken into account fully in the determination of
the extent of hunting and of animal husbandry." 283
The move from over-hunting communal "ownership," to controlled private
ownership, "suggests in this instance that the fur trade made it economic to en-
courage the husbanding of fur-bearing animals. ' 284 Husbanding was indeed nec-
essary to ensure that there were furbearing animals for years to come, but
"[h]usbanding requires the ability to prevent poaching and this, in turn, suggests
that socioeconomic changes in property in hunting land will take place."'285 Own-
ership of parcels small enough to control was possible because "[f]orest animals
confine their territories to relatively small areas, so that the cost of internalizing
274. Id. at 350.
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the effects of husbanding these animals is considerably reduced.' 286 The reduced
cost of husbanding, "together with the higher commercial value of fur-bearing
forest animals, made it productive to establish private hunting lands."
287
The same can be argued for data aggregation. As more metasites come into
existence to collect and disseminate more informittion, the tax on the value of the
data to online retailers, and arguably consumers, will become too great. The exter-
nal costs imposed on online retailers will become so great, either through actual
harm or precaution expense, that they may have to close or import technological
protections that inhibit the efficient use of the website. Either way, metasites are
creating inefficiencies and imposing externalities that appear to be endangering
the existence of commercial data on the Internet.
However, it is difficult to extend a property right, as in the Leacock example,
from real property to some sort of new intellectual property. Borders are more
difficult to demarcate on the Internet than they are on real property.2 88 While the
Leacock comparison is a somewhat entertaining exercise, it does not leave us with
an obvious conclusion that new property rights are necessary for digital data. It
does, however, reinforce the argument that for economic efficiency, data owners
must be able to control, to some extent, how their information is aggregated and
disseminated.
C. Market Forces v. Government Regulation
Instead of creating, for example, a new property right in data, some type of
regulation may be useful. As Professor Coase suggests, one alternative to the
institution of a market legal system is a system of direct government regulation:
"Instead of instituting a legal system of rights which can be modified by transac-
tions on the market, the government may impose regulations which state what
people must or must not do and which have to be obeyed." 289 Unlike a firm, the
government may avoid the market altogether if it wishes. 290 However, "the gov-
ernmental administrative machine is not itself costless [and] can, in fact, on occa-
sion be extremely costly."29 1 There is also no reason to believe that "regulations,
made by a fallible administration subject to political pressures and operating with-
out any competitive check, will necessarily always be those which increase the
efficiency with which the economic system operates." 292 Additionally, because
general regulations must be evenly applied to a wide variety of cases, such regula-
tions "will be enforced in some cases in which they are clearly inappropriate.
293
While it "follows that direct governmental regulation will not necessarily give
better results than leaving the problem to be solved by the market or the firm[,]..
. there is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental administrative regulation
should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency." 294 Certainly, the costs
286. Id. at 353.
287. Id.
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involved in government regulation will frequently outweigh the gain.295 How-
ever, it is important to recognize that "[a]ll solutions have costs and there is no
reason to suppose that government regulation is called for simply because the prob-
lem is not well handled by the market or the firm." 296
That said, it is important to note that an administrative agency that tries "to
perform the function normally carried out by the pricing mechanism operates un-
der two handicaps. '297 First, the agency "lacks the precise monetary measure of
benefit and cost provided by the market." 298 Second, the agency is unable to "be
in possession of all the relevant information possessed by the managers of every
business which uses or might use [the data], to say nothing of the preferences of
consumers for the various goods and services in the production of which [the data]
could be used."'299 Certainly, a private rights regime would be better in the case of
data aggregation because the parties possess much more relevant data and would
be more likely to come to an efficient result than an administrative agency. Fur-
thermore, the costs of imposing a governmental regulatory body to address the
issues would certainly outweigh the gain. 300
In reaction to government regulation of the airwaves beginning in the middle
of the twentieth century, Professor Coase insisted that a system of property rights
in which private parties are able to interact efficiently is essential to private-enter-
prise. 30 1 In regard to the Federal Communications Commission, Professor Coase
wrote that "[a] private-enterprise system cannot function properly unless property
rights are created in resources, and, when this is done, someone wishing to use a
resource has to pay the owner to obtain it.' ' 302 Once these rights are created,
"[c]haos disappears; and so does the government except that a legal system to
define property rights and to arbitrate disputes is, of course, necessary." 303 A
property system is essential to ensure that resource allocation is "determined by
the forces of the market rather than as a result of government decisions." 304
While that may be true for the airwaves or even for bandwidth today, it cannot
fully justify a new property right in digital data. It is highly unlikely that govern-
ment regulation over digital data would make any sort of sense from an efficiency
standpoint. Instead, some type of private market legal system would be best at
ensuring efficient exchange between parties. Professor Coase's arguments do sup-
port some sort of control over and transferability of digital data by the online re-
tailer. Therefore, we must take another look at liability and property regimes, this
time in comparison.
D. Choosing Between Liability and Property Rules
As mentioned earlier, there are two fundamental ways that the state may pro-
295. Id.
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297. Coase, FCC, supra note 1, at 18.
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tect online retailers' interest in their data: through property rules or liability rules.305
First, under property rules, the state "guarantees property right assignments against
infringement through the threatened use of its police powers." 306 Second, under
liability rules, the state "merely discourages violations by requiring transgressors
to pay victims for harms suffered. ' 30 7 Possessory interests, or interests in things,
"are generally protected by property rules, whereas interests in not suffering from
harmful externalities are often, though not always, protected only by liability
rules." 30 8
Judge Posner describes the traditional view of the influence of transaction
costs on the decision between liability and property rule protection. In settings of
low transaction costs, "the law should require parties to transact in the market; it
can do this by making the present property owner's right absolute (or nearly so), so
that anyone who thinks the property worth more has to negotiate with the owner.' '3° 9
Alternatively, where high transaction costs would be incurred, "people must be
allowed to use the courts to shift resources to a more valuable use, because the
market is by definition unable to perform this function in those settings. '310 As
we shall see, it is not clear that this dichotomy always holds true.
1. Entitlements
When two or more parties present the state with conflicting interests, the state
must decide which party to favor.311 Fundamentally, the law must "decide which
of the conflicting parties will be entitled to prevail. '3 12 Once that decision is
made, it is society's responsibility to enforce the choice. 3 13 It is not enough to
simply set the entitlement; the state must provide a minimum of intervention to
ensure enforcement. 314
The state therefore has the responsibility of making secondary decisions con-
cerning enforcement and protection. 315 The secondary "decisions go to the man-
ner in which entitlements are protected and to whether an individual is allowed to
sell or trade the entitlement. '3 16 The state is therefore charged with deciding which
party "wins" as well as what type of protection it must provide.317 In making this
latter decision, the state actually "shape[s] the subsequent relationship between
the winner and the loser... ."318 In examining this issue of protection, Professors
Calabresi and Melamed "consider[ed] three types of entitlements--entitlements
protected by property rules, entitlements protected by liability rules, and inalien-
305. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REv. 713,715 (1996).
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able entitlements. ' 3 19 For this Article we will consider the first two entitlement
protections: property and liability rules. 320
First, a property rule protects an entitlement "to the extent that someone who
wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a volun-
tary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller. '32 1
Inherent in this structure is a very limited amount of state intervention: "once the
original entitlement is decided upon, the state does not try to decide its value."' 322
Instead, the state allows "each of the parties to say how much the entitlement is
worth to him, and gives the seller a veto if the buyer does not offer enough. '323
While the state makes the collective decision concerning to whom the initial en-
titlement belongs, there is no collective decision as to the entitlement's value. 324
Alternatively, under liability rule protection, one party may destroy the en-
titlement by paying its objectively determined value to the entitlement holder.325
The value, under liability rule protection, is an approximation of what "the origi-
nal holder of the entitlement would have sold it for."'326 Once the state has objec-
tively set the determination of the value, the holder is estopped from claiming that
she would have demanded a higher payment for the entitlement.327 Liability rules,
in comparison to property rules, "involve an additional stage of state intervention:
not only are entitlements protected, but their transfer or destruction is allowed on
the basis of a value determined by some organ of the state rather than by the parties
themselves." 328
2. Economic Efficiency
Administrative efficiency often dictates which entitlement should be chosen
in each particular case. Frequently "the simplest reason for a particular entitle-
ment is to minimize the administrative costs of enforcement. '329 Administrative
efficiency is typically the winning factor "when the reasons accepted [by the state]
are indifferent between conflicting entitlements and one entitlement is cheaper to
enforce than the others." 330 Alternatively, administrative efficiency may also win-
out "when the reasons are not indifferent but lead us only slightly to prefer one
over another and the first is considerably more expensive to enforce than the sec-
ond.,,33 1
Economic efficiency concerns extend, of course, beyond costs of administra-
tion. As Professors Calabresi and Melamed argue, economic efficiency demands
the state to select those entitlements "which would lead to that allocation of re-
319. id.
320. Inalienable rights in terms of data would be wholly inefficient because they would
prohibit bargaining between the online retailers and the metasites.
321. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 230, at 1092.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1093.
330. Id.
331. Id.
MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
sources which could not be improved in the sense that a further change would not
so improve the condition of those who gained by it that they could compensate
those who lost from it and still be better off than before." 332 This situation, often
called Pareto optimality, "asks for that form of property, private or communal,
which leads to the highest product for the effort of producing." 333 The state, there-
fore, should choose the entitlement that creates a value of production that exceeds
even high cost administration.
In the absence of transaction costs, "Pareto optimality or economic efficiency
will occur regardless of the initial entitlement. '334 Parties will always bargain to
an efficient result. In such circumstances, "Pareto optimality is optimal given a
distribution of wealth, but different distributions of wealth imply their own Pareto
optimal allocation of resources. '335 In the absence of transaction costs, this sug-
gests that wealth, and not economic efficiency, will affect society's choice of en-
titlements. 336
3. Distributional Goals
As difficult as it is to analyze societal wealth distribution preferences, "they
play a crucial role in the setting of entitlements. '337 A society's "placement of
entitlements has a fundamental effect on a society's distribution of wealth." 33
8
Absolute equality, in monetary terms, cannot merely be achieved by "start[ing]
everyone off with the same amount of money."339 Indeed, in "[a] financially egali-
tarian society which gives individuals the right to make noise immediately makes
the would-be noisemaker richer than the silence loving hermit."'340 It is therefore
"very difficult to imagine a society in which there is complete equality of wealth. '34 1
A society must "choose what entitlements it wishes to have on the basis of criteria
other than perfect equality" because "perfect equality is impossible. ' 342
Society's determination of which entitlement "to sell, and which ... to give
away, will likely depend in part on which determination promotes the wealth dis-
tribution that society favors." 343 Intuitively, an "entitlement to a good or to its
converse is essentially inevitable. '"344 Society either entitles us to have silence or,
conversely, to make noise. 345 Society either entitles us "to our own property or
body or the right to share others' property or bodies. ' 346 In the case of data aggre-
gation, society either entitles metasites to gather data or entitles online retailers to
332. Id. at 1093-94.
333. Id. at 1094.
334. Id. at 1094-96 ("'[No transaction costs' must be understood extremely broadly as in-
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own the data. We cannot, of course, allow for either without social costs of precau-
tion (blocking the metasites) or property/liability rules (compensation for or in-
junction against the taking of the data).
4. The Interplay Between Property and Liability Rules
If society is squeamish about creating a new property right in data, it can
create an entitlement that is protected by a property rule. What is typically re-
ferred to as "private property can be viewed as an entitlement which is protected
by a property rule." 347 Under a property rule protection, "[n]o one can take the
entitlement to private property from the holder unless the holder sells it willingly
and at the price at which he subjectively values the property."348 The property
rule is not, however, always absolute; for example, "a nuisance with sufficient
public utility to avoid injunction has, in effect, the right to take property with com-
pensation. ' 349 In circumstances such as this, a liability rule protects the property
interest of the entitlement holder. A liability rule is "an external, objective stan-
dard of value [that] is used to facilitate the transfer of the entitlement from the
holder to the nuisance."'350
The question arises as to why we need liability rules in a world of entitlements
protected by property rules. 351 One primary consideration is the economic effi-
ciency that such rules afford. 352 In circumstances where liability rules are needed,
"the cost of establishing the value of an initial entitlement by negotiation is so
great that even though a transfer of the entitlement would benefit all concerned,
such a transfer will not occur."'353 Therefore, in order to facilitate such transfers in
an efficient manner, a collective determination of the value is required. 354 Fur-
thermore, "there is no reason to believe that a market, a decentralized system of
valuing, will cause people to express their true valuations and hence yield results
which all would in fact agree are desirable. ' ' 355 Whenever there is a hold-out
problem, "an argument can readily be made for moving from a property rule to a
liability rule. ' 356 The hold-out problem is solved when society removes the valu-
ation determination from the market, decides it collectively, and imposes an objec-
tive valuation. 357
If a system of entitlements is the efficient way to deal with data aggregation,
the state must choose the entitlement that creates a value of production that ex-
ceeds even high cost administration. As mentioned, a property rule protects an
347. Id. at 1105.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 1105-06.
351. See id. at 1106.
352. See id.
353. Id.
354. See id.
355. Id. at 1107.
356. Id.
357. Id.
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entitlement, causing a party that wishes to remove the entitlement to pay off the
holder at an agreed upon amount. A liability rule protecting an entitlement, on the
other hand, allows the party to destroy the entitlement by paying to the holder a
sum equal to the value objectively determined by an outside party. Of these two
entitlement protection rules, the property rule seems the most efficient. First, if
society is squeamish about creating a new property right in data, it can create an
entitlement that is protected by a property rule. This may help to eliminate many
of the costs of developing a new property right regime. Second, a property rule
promotes cooperative bargaining between the parties. Where a liability rule would
allow a metasite to take data from an online retailer after paying an objectively
determined sum, a property rule would ensure that the parties bargained for an
efficient result.
E. Nuisance Revisited
Another alternative is for online retailers to utilize current nuisance law to
attempt to control the aggregation and dissemination of their data. The following
is an examination of the use of nuisance law in cases of data aggregation.
1. Four Model Entitlement and Protection Rules
Nuisance problems can be viewed in terms of four entitlement rules and cor-
responding protection rules. 35 8 First, X may not undertake the offending activity
unless Y allows it (Y may enjoin X's nuisance). 359 Second, X may undertake the
offending activity but must compensate Y "for damages caused (nuisance is found
but the remedy is limited to damages)." '360 Third, X may undertake the offending
activity at will and can only be stopped by Y if Y pays him to stop (X's offending
activity is not held to be a nuisance to y). 361 Fourth, which Professors Calabresi
and Melamed add, Y may stop X, but if he does he must compensate X.362
The first two rules "(nuisance with injunction, and with damages only) are
entitlements to [y].- 363 The first entitlement to Y allows Y "to be free from [the
offending activity] and is protected by a property rule; the second is also an entitle-
ment to be free from [the offending activity] but is protected only by a liability
rule."'364 The third rule, alternatively, "is instead an entitlement to [X] protected
by a property rule, for only by buying [X] out at [X's] price can [Y] end the [of-
fending activity]." 365 The fourth rule also represents an entitlement in X to under-
take the offending activity, but the entitlement is only protected by a liability rule.366
From an economic efficiency approach, rule one would be employed "if we
believed that [XI could avoid or reduce the costs of [the offending activity] more
cheaply than [Y],, 367 In other words, we would only enjoin X if he were better
358. See id. at 1115-16 (citing Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental
Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALe L.J. 647, 670 (1971)).
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. id.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 1118.
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able to balance the costs of undertaking the offending activity against the costs of
not undertaking the offending activity.368 The entitlement under rule two would
be employed "simply because we did not know whether [X] desired to [undertake
the offending activity] more than [Y] desired to be free from [the offending activ-
ity], and the only way we thought we could test out the value of the [offending
activity] was by the only liability rule we thought we had. This was rule two, the
imposition of nuisance damages on [X]'369
Alternatively, rule three should be employed, "again solely from an economic
efficiency standpoint, if we made the converse judgment on who could best bal-
ance the harm of [the offending activity] against its avoidance costs."'370 Further-
more, "[i]f we were wrong in our judgments and if transactions between [X] and
[Y] were costless or even very cheap, the entitlement under rules one or three
would be traded and an economically efficient result would occur in either case."'37 1
The fourth rule, as well, "gives at least the possibility that the opposite entitlement
may also lead to economic efficiency in a situation of uncertainty." 37
2
An economic analysis of the effects of each rule sheds light on the situations
in which the use of each is proper. Enjoining the nuisance, under rule one, might
be desirable for economic efficiency purposes, "but it would have disastrous dis-
tribution effects."'37 3 Rule one "would also have undesirable efficiency effects if
the initial judgment on costs of avoidance had been wrong and transaction costs
were high."'374 However, in the case of data aggregation it seems that rule one
would promote bargaining between the metasite and the online retailer. This would
lead to an efficient outcome.
The imposition of nuisance damages, under rule two, "would allow a testing
of the economic efficiency of eliminating the [offending activity], even in the pres-
ence of high transaction costs, but would quite possibly put [Y] out of business or
diminish output and thus have the same income distribution effects as rule one."'375
That said, for data aggregation disputes, the difficulty and costs involved in deter-
mining damages and prosecuting the nuisance would lead to an inefficient result.
Due to the flux nature of Internet commerce, a determination of damages may be
impossible.
No nuisance, under rule three, "would have favorable distributional effects
since it might protect the income of the workers [of X]." 376 However, if the harm
to Y of the offending activity outweighed the cost to X of avoiding it, "and if
transaction costs-holdout problems-were such that [Y] could not ... pay [X
off], rule three would have unsatisfactory efficiency effects." 377 Under rule four,
the payment of damages to Y after X compels it to avoid the offending activity
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1120 (emphasis added).
370. Id. at 1118.
371. Id. ("Wherever transactions between [X] and [Y] are easy, and wherever economic ef-
ficiency is our goal, we could employ entitlements protected by property rules even though we
would not be sure that the entitlement chosen was the right one.").
372. Id. at 1120.
373. Id. at 1121.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id
377. Id.
[Vol. 56:1
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
"would be the only one which would accomplish both the distributional and effi-
ciency goals." 378 Neither rules three or four make sense in the case of data aggre-
gation. It is too easy to enter the market and begin aggregating data, thus promot-
ing parties to extort the online retailer even if they have no real interest in creating
a legitimate metasite.
2. Injunctive Relieffor Nuisance
Injunctive relief is necessary in certain nuisance cases because it strengthens
the victim's bargaining position. 379 The "right to an injunction enables victims to
bargain from a position of strength." 380 This is economically efficient because
victims with the right to enjoin "will not accept an injurer's settlement offer unless
it involves a combination of abatement and compensation that the victims prefer to
an injunction. '38 1 This injunctive right "establishes the victims' threat point in
bargaining; the injurer cannot induce the victims to settle unless the terms of the
cooperative solution benefit the victims more than the advantage they derive from
exercising their threat. ' 382 With "private bargaining, the right to injunctive relief
against nuisances offers the potential for combining compensation with effi-
ciency."38 3
However, these goals of compensation and efficiency that are promoted by
the threat of an injunctive right are usually only realized by the parties upon settle-
ment. The injunctive right is usually only exercised, and an injunction issued, if
there has been a breakdown in the bargaining process. 384 If an injunction is is-
sued, efficient behavior will not be induced until a "coercive order prescribes it,
which is unlikely given the court's limited information." 385 Therefore, "from an
efficiency perspective, injunction is an appropriate remedy for classes of cases in
which settlement is usual and trials are rare." 386 In data aggregation disputes, this
seems most likely. Metasites and online retailers would more likely want to come
to a bargaining resolution than resort to litigation because the law is unsettled.
Although giving the right of injunction to the online retailer would settle the law
somewhat, it would most likely encourage a quicker and more efficient outcome
than litigation.
F More on Transaction Costs in Cyberspace
There is doubt
that property rules are best when transaction costs are low-assertedly because
the use of property rules will induce parties to bargain and reach desirable out-
comes-whereas liability rules are best when transaction costs are high-sup-
posedly because the use of liability rules will induce injurers to act desirably,
378. Id.
379. Cooter, supra note 145, at 27.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
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mimicking the outcomes that would otherwise have been reached through bar-
gaining. 387
Professors Kaplow and Shavell argue that this maxim is often contradicted in prac-
tice: "when transaction costs are low, parties will tend to bargain under liability
rules as well as under property rules and may reach outcomes superior to those
reached under property rules; and when transaction costs are high and bargaining
is impossible, property rules may lead to better outcomes. . . ,,388
When harmful externalities arise, the parties are often inhibited from bargain-
ing practically with the other, which allows that "the resolution of difficulties will
be determined directly by the choice of legal rules." 389 Scholars commonly view
liability rules as superior to property rules, "assuming that courts can accurately
determine the extent of harm." 390 Some scholars suggest, however, "that liability
rules may be inferior to property rules if courts would have difficulty ascertaining
the actual level of harn."39 1 These scholars believe that court underestimation of
harm may induce a liable firm to undertake the offending activity "even though its
prevention cost is less than the true level of harm, whereas under a property rule
protecting victims, the firm would not [undertake the offending activity]." '392 Like-
wise, a court's overestimation of harm may impose an inefficient burden on the
offending party and discourage the victim from taking efficient precautions. In the
case of aggregation, given the flux nature of Internet commerce, it is likely that the
courts would have extreme difficulty in determining actual damages for online
retailers.
However, according to Professors Kaplow and Shavell, that latter belief is
mistaken. 393 The two argue that "even when courts are uncertain about the mag-
nitude of harm, liability rules are superior to property rules." 394 Even "if a court
sets damages equal to its best estimate of harm-the average harm for cases char-
acterized by the facts the court observes-the outcome under the liability rule will
be superior, on average, to the outcome under property rules." 395 However, "the
superiority of the liability rule might not follow, though, if courts were systemati-
cally to underestimate harm in setting damages, rather than to use estimates of
harm that are correct on average."'39 6 Furthermore, in situations where the wealth
of the injurers is inadequate to cover the possible liability for the harm, a liability
rule will not be able to induce the judgment-proof injurers to prevent the harm. 397
The cost of bargaining under property rules also tends to be higher than under
liability rules.398 This is because "the liability rule tends to produce the efficient
result more often than property rules do (assuming that the state's information is
imperfect)."'399 That improved likelihood of an efficient result means that "bar-
387. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 305, at 718 (footnotes omitted).
388. Id. (footnotes omitted).
389. Id. at 719.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. (emphasis omitted).
395. Id.
396. Id. at 720.
397. Id. at 721.
398. Id. at 742.
399. Id.
[Vol. 56:1
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
gaining to avoid a suboptimal result will occur less often under the liability rule." 400
However, in a situation where parties can bargain with each other costlessly, "the
choice between property and liability rules should diminish in importance because,
if the rule chosen would lead to a suboptimal result, the parties could in principle
make a mutually desirable agreement incorporating the optimal result, harm or no
harm, as the case may be."'40 1 For data aggregation disputes, bargaining between
the parties appears to be the only means to an efficient outcome.
In a world where "the court has perfect information about the values of a thing
both to the owner and to the taker, then (as in the case of externalities) it makes no
difference whether a property or liability rule is employed." 402 The court will
award an entitlement "to the owner if he values a thing more highly than the taker;
otherwise the entitlement will be awarded to the taker."403 This is true because
with liability rule protection, "the taker will take the thing if and only if he values
it more highly than the owner, because damages will equal the true value to the
owner. '404 Therefore, regardless of the type of rule, "the thing will be, or come to
be, possessed by the party who values it more highly."40 5
Professors Kaplow and Shavell point to "an idea that property rule protection
of things is good because it forces someone who wants something to bargain for it,
and presumably he will tend to obtain it if and only if he values it more highly than
does the owner."4 6 This reasoning is misleading because "under a liability rule, a
potential taker will also tend to obtain a thing if and only if he values it more
highly than does the owner."'407 For example, in cases where "damages do not
equal owners' valuations, bargaining may be necessary, as under property rule pro-
tection."40 8 More specifically, "if, under a liability rule, a taker would decide to
take a thing, and the owner wished to pay him not to do so because the owner
places a higher value on the thing, the taker will very much have reason to bargain
for a payment from the owner."409 The aspect that is most advantageous for the
possessor under the property rule "is not that it encourages prospective takers to
bargain," but rather that it "gives owners an incentive to bargain that they would
not have under the liability rule, because under the liability rule, an owner's pay-
ment to a taker to step aside would be wasted on account of other prospective
takers waiting in the wings." 4 10 As this examination has shown, given the specific
nature of data aggregation disputes and the difficulty in courts determining actual
damages (or even a near guess), it is most likely that an efficient outcome will be
reached by the parties bargaining. A property rule protecting an entitlement is
therefore the better legal regime for data aggregation disputes.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 732. "This observation is an application of the Coase Theorem." Id.
402. Id. at 759.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 764.
407. Id. at 764-65.
408. Id. at 765.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 767 (emphasis omitted).
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VI. CONCLUSION
As this Article demonstrates, the reality of Internet activity does not allow for
the easy molding of a traditional legal remedy to the modem problem of data ag-
gregation. Weighing the efficiency interests of online retailers against metasites
has proven to be a difficult task. New technology's ability to affect new social,
economic, and legal systems creates uncertainty across the board. One primary
feature that does hold-over from "old" to "new economies" is the efficiency pro-
duced by bargaining parties. Any new legal regime designed to address data ag-
gregation must encourage parties to bargain to ensure efficiency.
As discussed earlier, smaller-scale, more in-depth pricing and product review
operations, such as Consumer Reports, should not be prohibited from reporting on
data without authorization. Instead, large-scale data aggregation, which by design
provides non-real time and often non-homogenous product and pricing compari-
sons, should be controlled. Creating a new property right in data, while generating
certain efficiency benefits, creates inefficient prohibitions on use. The proper le-
gal regime, alternatively, must control how data are aggregated and collected. The
most likely source for this is an entitlement forcing metasite robots to respect robot
exclusion headers or other requirements, such as homogeneity of products com-
pared or real-time price quoting. The entitlement, protected by a property rule,
would encourage parties to bargain because the rights of each would be clearer.
Such bargaining would lead to the most efficient result.
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